In this paper we generalize the heterogeneous risk adverse agents model of diffusion of new products in a multi-firm, heterogeneous and interacting agents environment. We use a model of choice under uncertainty based on Bayesian theory. We discuss the possibility of product failures, the set of equilibria, their stability and some welfare properties depending on the degree of diversification.
Introduction
The analysis of diffusion processes is interesting under at least two different perspectives. First of all, scholars usually concentrate on new products, but it is possible to generalize many conclusions to the adoption of new technologies, behaviours, fashions and strategies (in the game-theoretic sense), so enlarging the focus significantly. Second, diffusion is in essence a multi-disciplinary matter: the literature that has studied the problem spans from management to sociology, from psychology to physics including, obviously, alternative economic approaches 1 .
The literature has discussed both the conditions that favour or hamper diffusion −bringing eventually to failure or success− and the speed of diffusion, looking at the factors giving rise to different possible patterns, and in particular to an epidemiologic-like S-shaped curve.
A satisfactory picture should be grounded on some essential building blocks. The first one is uncertainty: the very novelty of goods (ideas, technologies, behaviours etc.) implies that agents must act using conjectures over some unknown feature, as in standard Bayesian approaches (Jensen 1982 , Feder and O'Mara 1982 , Tsur et al. 1990 , Chatterjee and Eliashberg 1990 , Young 2006 . The second block is heterogeneity: individual models are necessarily different at the outset, since they summarize personal conjectures, previous learning and a priori ideas (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Cowan and Jonard 2003 and 2004; Lopez Pintado and Watts, 2006) . The third block is interaction: the learning activity on the part of agents exploits past observations, stemming mainly from other agents' choices. Interaction thus shapes the overall process, making it path dependent. Coupling all this with some degree of non-linearity might finally allow for multiple equilibria, and hence non-uniqueness of outcomes (lock-in: see Arthur 1994 , Amable 1992 , Agliardi 1998 , Aoki and Yoshikawa 2002 , Young 2007 ).
In Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) we developed a setup which includes risk aversion and the interaction between demand for and supply of a single new product. The presence of both aspects distances that paper from other existing models. Risk aversion is relevant, because during the learning process the emergence of information shapes the confidence of agents (as captured by individual precisions), so altering their willingness to pay. This aspect was already recognised by some 2 , but never worked out in a fully fledged dynamical learning model, as done instead in Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) . Demandsupply interaction allows one to free the analysis from the single-sided approach prevailing in the literature 3 ; in addition, this allows to model explicitly firms' uncertainty over demand. The main results proved in that paper were: a positive probability of failure of an otherwise 'good' product, depending on consumers' priors; the possibility of different shapes of the diffusion curve of the new product (besides the usual S-shaped one), depending again on consumers' priors; the existence of a continuum of market equilibria, depending on the firm's prior on demand; the possibility that a part of those equilibria are dynamically unstable under learning, especially if the firm is highly uncertain about demand; and finally a monotonic relation between the degree of stability and welfare effects.
In the present paper we generalize the previous results analyzing a multiple good case, i.e. abandoning monopoly and moving to monopolistic competition, but still retaining consumers' and firms' heterogeneity and uncertainty, and consumers' risk aversion. As in the first paper, we provide purely analytical results, characterizing the full set of equilibria of the diffusion process together with their stability properties under the learning dynamics, without relying on simple simulations exercises which in the end give only a partial understanding of the overall process. To our knowledge this is the first article that analyzes analytically the property of a model with multiple goods, two-side uncertainty and heterogeneous agents. Moreover, in the end of the paper we endogenize the number of firms, i.e. we discuss entry, while in Proposition 1 we discuss failure, i.e. exit. This means that this paper is launching the basis for an overall treatment of the establishment of a new market under heterogeneity and interaction, without relying simply on simulations.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the demand side, Section 3 the supply one, Section 4 presents and discusses the main results, Section 5 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Consumers
The individual consumer j ( M j K , 1 = ) maximizes her expected utility choosing the level of consumption of each new good i ( n i K , 1 = ), over whose qualities she is uncertain. Qualities are independent normal variables, with known precision and unknown mean. Following a standard Bayesian setting, we assume consumers to be endowed with a prior over the unknown mean quality of each good, defined by two hyper-parameters
µ and
τ , respectively the mean and the precision (the inverse of the variance, see DeGroot, 1970 ) that evolve through time being updated using Bayes' rule. We assume additively separable preferences. From now on t denotes time, ranging discretely from zero onwards.
We represent the consumer problem in the following way: (  [  max   1  ,  ,  1  ,  ,  ,  ,  1   1  ,  ,  1  ,  ,  ,  ,  }  {   ,  ,  1 , ,
3 Some noteworthy exceptions are Bergemann and Välimäki (1997) and Vettas (1998 is incorporated into agents' preferences.
In particular, as in the single good framework of Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) , we
, meaning that the consumer wishes to purchase more if quality is higher, for given price; and (ii)
e. consumers are risk averse in quality 6 : this suggests that a higher variance of quality tends to depress (expected) marginal utility and hence consumption, for given price.
As in Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) , we posit u(⋅) = (⋅) δ , and f (λ i ) = A − exp(−λ i ); we assume in addition λ i~N (µ i ,r), due to random production and/or delivery factors, where the true mean µ i is unknown, and r is known, to consumers; the different qualities are statistically independent. The individual prior, defined over the mean of each quality, is also assumed normal, which allows us to use the properties of the conjugate family 7 . The advantage of these assumptions is threefold: first, they satisfy the two conditions (i-ii) above; second, they allow us to "pass through" the expected value operator using the fact that, owing to normality and to the exponential, f (λ i ) is log-normal; finally, they imply, as we shall see, that consumers are not bound to buy a positive quantity of each good. This last property is useful to study the effects of noisy quality signals on consumers' choices, addressing the possibility of lock-in, i.e. the failure of a diffusion of a "good" product.
As regards the timing of events, the consumer makes her choice at time t using all information available at that time, which is captured through her posterior, and before knowing the others' choices at t. All the new information refers then to choices made at t−1, hence the hyper-parameters relevant for the choice at t are
This given, standard maximization 8 implies the following individual demand curve for each good j:
4 In (1) agents take expectations with respect to all the available information at time t, which obviously includes the information revealed by the market in the previous period, thus we use the time subscript t-1 for hyper-parameters. The reason will become clear in a while. 5 The term sub-utility is standard in the literature that uses additively separable structure, either summing through time of through goods. In our setup it simply expresses the utility of the consumption of one specific good. 6 In the standard choice theory, risk aversion is deemed as negativity of the second derivative. In our setup, this property obviously holds for quality, since u(⋅) is strictly increasing and the utility function U is multiplicatively separable in quality and quantity. However, we preferred to present this characteristic in terms of third cross-derivative, because we want to stress the implication for the quantity purchased. 7 A utility function similar to that used in the present setup was proposed also by Roberts and Urban (1988) , who however did not explore analytically the dynamic implications of learning and of demand-supply interaction, limiting themselves to simulations exercises. 8 We refer to the solution of the problem (1), i.e. maximization of expected utility under a budget constraint, where the choice variables are the quantities of each good, and the functional forms of u and f are as said above. The problem is strictly concave on a compact feasible set, which implies that the solution is unique.
where one must intend 0 , ,
, we say that consumer j is active on market i at time t.
The interpretation is straightforward: each consumer spends a share of its total income on good i, depending on the ratio of its price-quality term to that of the whole bundle of goods. Total actual market demand for good i,
Q , , is simply the summation over the j index.
After buying the chosen quantity, each active consumer receives a quality signal that she publicly announces to all consumers: these signals are used by each of them to update her conjecture. Using the properties of conjugate families (DeGroot, 1970) , the posterior parameters for the normal-normal couple (respectively, the likelihood and the prior) are calculated simply as:
λ is the quality sample mean, computed from the announced perceived qualities,
is the number of active buyers at date t. Notice that consumers treat qualities as independent, and update their conjectures accordingly (that is, separately for each good).
The above equation simply tells us that consumers average their own prior opinions and the sample mean of quality from the new observations, the weight being the relative precisions of the two measures. Moreover, through time individual precisions grow linearly: as one can imagine, given the assumptions of quality-risk-aversion, this fact tends to raise demand in time, due to a simple informational effect.
Firms
Firms interact in monopolistic competition, each producing a new good at a constant marginal cost c i : since each firm corresponds to a single product, as in standard monopolistic competition, we use the i index to define a firm. Every firm is uncertain over its own demand. To make things as simple as possible, we assume that it conjectures a linear demand defined by two parameters: more precisely, given the price 
as the firm's initial precisions of the mean parameters.
As in the consumer case, the timing is as follows: the firm announces the price before observing demand, hence it uses its (t−1)-conjecture, formed observing demand at time t−1. The firm chooses the price so as to maximize expected profit. Therefore, from standard First Order Condition in monopoly, the price announced at date t is:
and expects the following demand:
We neglect any capacity constraint, and assume that the firm can meet all demand 11 .
The updating process on the part of firm i follows, again, standard Bayesian rules: using primes to denote transposed vectors, define the row vector
. Given our assumptions, one has (DeGroot, 1970, Chapter 11):
and
By simple algebra, (7) can be rewritten as:
10 This derives from our assumption that the conditional distribution of t i Q , has known precision equal to 1; if this precision were different from 1, the precision matrix
Γ would be multiplied by its value. Things could be generalized, but this would be immaterial for our results, since firm's expected profit does not depend on precisions, given risk neutrality.
In a nutshell, the above expression tells us that the new mean parameters are equal to the previous period's ones, plus a correction term depending the prediction error 12 and adjusted for the new precision matrix.
Equilibria: Main Results
The system can be fully characterized in terms of firms' and consumers' hyperparameters. 
, we compact all the updating equations 13 in the following system of n nM 6 2 + first order difference equations:
which completely describes the learning and diffusion dynamics.
Risk aversion on the part of consumers makes them sensitive to all piece of information available: as time goes by, new information can increase precisions and raise their demand, ceteris paribus. For this reason the system shows path dependence and irreversibility. The relevant equilibrium concept is thus a steady state one, meaning the agents' conjectures remain fixed in time. We use in fact a conjectural equilibrium notion: a conjectural equilibrium is a fixed point of (10).
One might think that a conjectural equilibrium requires that all consumers have necessarily learnt the true qualities of the goods. In fact, if new information keeps arriving, the Law of Large Numbers implies that consumers are bound to learn the true qualities. It is also possible, however, that consumers are endowed initially with pessimistic conjectures about one of the goods, so demanding a null quantity of it: a null demand, in turn, implies that no signal will arrive at next date, and conjectures remain unchanged (lock-in). More importantly, it might happen that, even starting from a positive demand at date t, a highly biased signal switches demand off at date 1 + t : we term "failure" this phenomenon.
As regards this last point, we recall one of the results of Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) . Proposition 1. Suppose that demand for good i is positive at time t. Then, there exists positive probability of failure of the i-th product at time t + 1.
12 Notice in fact that
is expected demand, given the prior. 13 Taking account of (2) and (5).
Proof. See Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) , Proposition 1.
The argument runs as follows: at every time t we can build a complete ordering over the set of consumers in terms of a function of their mean and precision hyper-parameters (the indicator being ) 2 / ( ): the higher its value, the higher a consumer's 'optimism'. If a signal is so biased as to drive the most optimistic consumer below a certain threshold (recall that A < exp(−λ i ) implies no purchase), then all demands are driven to zero. But then no information is made available to update conjectures, and consumers are locked-in at zero demand 14 . Finally, using our assumptions on distributions, we can prove that the probability of such an event is always positive. We do not report the complete proof here, since it is quite long and in addition the mentioned ordering has a number of interesting implications that are worth investigating on their own.
We come now to a different set of results, assuming that failure does not occur. In this case a conjectural equilibrium is a situation in which consumers' conjectured means have converged to the true mean qualities, and in addition firms' conjectures are confirmed by the true demands, so that prediction errors are zero and firms' conjectures remain unchanged at subsequent dates 15 . We can fix the ideas taking
, and studying the dynamics in expected value terms 16 , i.e. with the signals always equal to the true qualities, so that demands stay constant for given prices (and consumers' precisions are free to diverge as in the standard Bayesian setting).
This given, define
as the excess of actual demand over expected one for good i; thus the equilibrium condition can be written as follows:
a set of n equations. Then the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 2.
There exists a n-dimensional equilibrium manifold in the space of firms' parameters.
Proof. (11) is a system of n equations in 2n variables, hence the set of solutions is generically a n-dimensional manifold.
Conjectural equilibria, then, form a continuum: there is not a unique steady state that can be attained by the system. Although mathematically simple, this proposition states that the reliance on "fundamentals equilibrium reasoning" by standard theory, leading to uniqueness results, should be taken with caution, since it is not robust to the weakening of the common prior assumption. Notice that different conjectural equilibria differ among themselves as regards prices and quantities, and hence welfare as well, not as regards the qualities perceived by consumers, since we are assuming that these have been learned perfectly.
A natural question is now the stability of equilibria along the manifold. Given the continuum, we must speak of Lyapunov stability: that is, stable equilibria are not asymptotically (locally) stable, since a small displacement from one stable equilibrium to another does not cause convergence back to the former. In addition, in the case of stability, different initial conditions lead to different final states.
We study stability of equilibria at any finite time, recalling that we are assuming j i The intuition for this result can be seen using Figure 1 . A possible equilibrium position is A, where the firm maximizes profits, given its conjecture, and there is no prediction error. From the definition of equilibrium, price and quantity are common to both the true and the conjectured demand, so the condition of Proposition 3 implies that the derivative of the conjectured demand is higher (in absolute value) than that of true demand. On the contrary, a B-like equilibrium is one where the true demand is less rigid than the conjectured one. Look at expression (9), and at how it can be rewritten according to Appendix A.2: in the presence of excess demand a firm updates its parameters in such a way that the α parameter grows and the β parameter decreases 17 . Hence, using (5), it follows that firm will raise its price at the subsequent date. The opposite holds in the presence of excess supply. Consider now what is happening in a neighbourhood of A; a higher (resp. smaller) price, such as h p (resp. l p ) generates excess supply (resp. demand), thus inducing the firm to raising (resp. lowering) further its price. It is then apparent that the system moves away from the A equilibrium. A similar reasoning for a B-like equilibrium shows that in this case there can exist a basin of attraction (unless there is overshooting, a possibility shown by Proposition 4 below). This type of instability is obviously local, since we can only study linear approximations.
In a B-like equilibrium we could still observe local instability at some finite time, instability being of the oscillatory type. This property, however, is smoothed by the passing of time and the instability is rapidly reabsorbed. In fact we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium where the true elasticity is high and the demand conjectured by a single firm is more rigid than the true one, there can exist oscillatory instability as long as t is small, and provided that the firms' initial precisions are low.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Under the condition of this Proposition, if the system starts in a neighbourhood of some equilibrium the variables will be pushed away from it, and, given the continuum of equilibria, the location of the steady state depends on initial conditions. Observe however that the same unstable equilibria are turned into stable ones by the passing of time, that has the effect of increasing firms' precisions, as apparent from the proof of Proposition 4.
We can finally add some further results in terms of welfare. In Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) , studying a single firm, we analyzed the relation between welfare and stability along the equilibrium manifold. In the present context the higher dimensionality makes things more complex: it is not so easy to identify how individual parameters change together along the manifold; and we cannot block n-1 firms, trying to concentrate on a single one, since changing one price implies obviously changes in all expenditure shares. We leave this point for further research.
Our multiple-good setup, however, allows us to analyze the degree of diversification of the decentralized economy and its welfare properties, although under some stricter assumptions. This is a fairly standard procedure in Monopolistic Competition literature: we need to endogenize the number of firms (i.e. the number of varieties) by means of a fixed cost of entry (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Tirole, 1988; Bertoletti et al. 2008) , then 17 In A.1 it is shown that (9) is equivalent to ( )
, where
was defined before expression (11) above: see (16) and (23) in that Appendix. As a consequence, one can easily check that if
, that is, if true demand exceeds conjectured demand, then the first element of ( )
is positive, while the second is negative.
free entry implies a zero profit condition, which closes the model. Indeed, the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium with endogenous number of firms (assuming a positive fixed cost of entry) and identical marginal cost and qualities of goods, there is over (resp.
under) diversification, if for the marginal firms −defined as that who fix the price at the lowest level in equilibrium− the true elasticity is greater (resp. lower) than the conjectured one.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The interpretation is fairly obvious. Define T ε and C ε to be the true elasticity and that conjectured by firms: when the full information case is characterised by efficiency, in equilibrium the condition A caveat about this result: it is partly dependent on the particular form of the utility function. In general, the relation between the optimal degree of diversification and that prevailing under perfect information depends on how consumers' preferences affect the mark-up, since the latter is related to the ability of firms to appropriate the surplus (see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) . In our case, the iso-elastic assumption guarantees efficiency. However in the general case the ratio among the true elasticity and the conjectured one still allows us to characterize over and under diversification with respect to the perfect information case; of course one cannot say any longer that the degree of diversification prevailing under perfect information is also optimal.
Conclusions
This work studied a monopolistic competitive market, where firms innovate introducing new products and are uncertain about demand; at the same time, consumers are heterogeneous as regards their expectations on product qualities, which they are uncertain about. A key feature of the setup is quality risk aversion on the part of consumers, affecting their willingness to pay for products, due to their degree of uncertainty that in turn depends on past choices of all agents. Indeed, there is interaction in time among and between the market sides: such interaction shapes the learning process and the final pattern observed. In spite of the seeming complexity, we are able to characterize analytically some relevant properties of the stationary states of the dynamics without resorting to simulations, as is instead common in many studies of product diffusion.
The main results can be summarised as follows. First, there is positive probability of lockin, that is high-quality products can fail to diffuse while lower-quality ones can succeed: this does not depend on some 'objective' increasing returns (as in, e.g., Arthur, 1984) , but on the constellation of consumers' priors, coupled with learning and risk aversion. Second, differently from the "fundamentals equilibrium reasoning" of standard theory, we find a continuum of conjectural equilibria, i.e. stationary states of the learning process. These two results are common to the single-firm case studied by Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) : however, in the present monopolistic-competition setup the topological dimension of the equilibrium manifold is higher, since it equals the number of firms or goods; in other terms, we have a higher degree of indeterminacy.
The multi-firm case analysed in this work shows in addition that the (local) stability properties of conjectural equilibria under the learning dynamics can be multifarious: if a firm conjectures a demand curve that is more elastic than the true one, then we have monotonically unstable equilibria (Proposition 3). However, it is not always the case that, if conjectured demands are all less elastic than true ones, then equilibria are stable: indeed, if the true elasticity is high, and if a single firm conjectures a low elasticity but at the same time is very uncertain, then we could observe unstable oscillations around equilibria (Proposition 4). These unstable equilibria, that in view of the subsequent Proposition 5 are somehow inefficient, turn into stable ones when firms' uncertainty decreases, i.e. as time elapses. This means that it is not true that learning or 'evolution' weeds out inefficiency.
Finally, the setup has been used to study endogenous entry and optimal diversification, at least under some further assumptions. We proved that the case when firms conjecture an elasticity equal to the true one in equilibrium is not only dynamically stable, but is also efficient in terms of diversification. In our decentralised environment, however, the learning process can approach any one of a very large number of stationary states, not only that efficient result, depending on firms' priors about demand. This observation makes room for possible corrective policies. In addition, also the above-mentioned lock-in problem might highlight the necessity of policies, aimed at disseminating greater information on quality among consumers.
To our knowledge this is the first article that studies analytically the property of a model with multiple goods, two-side uncertainty and heterogeneous agents. Moreover, we endogenize the number of firms, i.e. we discuss entry, and in addition we discuss failure, i.e. exit. This means that this paper is launching the basis for an overall treatment of the establishment of a new market under heterogeneity and interaction.
Further research includes the use of more sophisticated firms (oligopoly or conjectural variations models), and the characterization of the welfare properties along the continuum of equilibria. Of course the model could be simulated to study the shapes of alternative diffusion curves, and to enquire how final outcomes depend on initial conditions. As regards this last point, we claim that our model can be a workhorse for scholars aiming at simulating the diffusion patterns of multiple goods considering explicitly the role of supply and not only of demand. This setup is sufficiently flexible to account for a network topology of the updating process (indeed, an agent might receive information from a subset of agents), and for many kinds of noisy disturbances. An interesting aspect of the story is that rationality of agents populating these artificial worlds is not so bounded as to abandon Bayesian decision theory altogether.
Appendix

A.1. Proof of Proposition 3
The system is highly non-linear, so we should limit ourselves to discuss local stability, using a linear approximation in a neighbourhood of one equilibrium. The Jacobian matrix of ) ( 1 − = t t F y y is easily checked to be the following one: 
where k I is the k-identity matrix and
The stability condition is that all the eigenvalues of J, evaluated at an equilibrium, do not lie outside the unit circle. We need some preliminary results.
Claim 1. At an equilibrium, the eigenvalues of J are those of the four blocks along its main diagonal.
Proof. We need simply to prove that 
where
was defined before expression (11). Define finally
Summing up, firm i's updating formula can be written as
and the block which interests us now is:
which is clearly equal to zero, since from (11) ( ) 0 = ⋅ i g in equilibrium, and the i g 's themselves do not depend on firms' precisions.
QED
We can thus concentrate on the four principal blocks of J. The NW block has eigenvalues lower than one, and tending to one as time goes to infinity: they are the weights attached to consumers' prior means in the updating formulae: see (3) above. The second and fourth blocks give rise to respectively nM and 4n eigenvalues equal to one: they relate to the updating of consumers' and firms' precisions, and are immaterial for stability. In fact changes in the precisions do not affect the equilibrium itself, being more important in the initial, rather than the final, phases of the learning process (Rampa, 1989) .
We (ii) the other n eigenvalues are equal to 
... 
Given (16), and given that ( ) 0
in equilibrium, one deduces:
This matrix has 2n eigenvalues equal to 1 plus those of the second term. Since by construction correspond precisely to the very existence of the n-dimensional continuum of equilibria: a move along this continuum is followed neither by divergence nor by convergence to the previous point. This completes the proof of part (i) of Claim 2.
(ii) In order to study the remaining n eigenvalues of
, we can write:
where 
Each of the diagonal blocks of matrix C t , in turn, can be written 18 as: , which must be maximized in n, considered as a real variable for simplicity. The first order condition is also sufficient, due to the strict concavity of the indirect utility function, and is the following: 
The equilibrium condition with endogenous number of firms is a zero profit condition for the marginal firm, defined by the price } | min{ 
By simple algebra we get 
